# Aff

## Solvency

### 2AC – Solvency – AI

#### Political fights and lack of AI integration into systems wrecks interoperability

Fournier-Tombs, 21 (Eleonore Fournier-Tombs, 5-31-2021, "The United Nations needs to start regulating the 'Wild West' of artificial intelligence," Conversation, <https://theconversation.com/the-united-nations-needs-to-start-regulating-the-wild-west-of-artificial-intelligence-161257>, LASA-CSK)

Conversely, the lack of regulation at the United Nations can be considered a challenge for agencies seeking to adopt more effective and novel technologies. As such, many systems seem to have been developed and later abandoned without being integrated into actual decision-making systems. An example of this is the Jetson tool, which was developed by UNHCR to predict the arrival of internally displaced persons to refugee camps in Somalia. The tool does not appear to have been updated since 2019, and seems unlikely to transition into the humanitarian organization’s operations. Unless, that is, it can be properly certified by a new regulatory system. Trust in AI is difficult to obtain, particularly in United Nations work, which is highly political and affects very vulnerable populations. The onus has largely been on data scientists to develop the credibility of their tools.

#### Slaughterbots prove unanimity makes UN regulation of AI impossible

Shaed, 21 (Sam Shead, 12-17-2021, “UN talks to ban ‘slaughterbots’ collapsed — here’s why that matters,” CNBC, <https://www.cnbc.com/2021/12/22/un-talks-to-ban-slaughterbots-collapsed-heres-why-that-matters.html>, LASA-CSK)

A UN conference failed to agree on banning the use and development of so-called “slaughterbots” at a meeting in Geneva last week, raising alarm bells among experts in artificial intelligence, military strategy, disarmament and humanitarian law. Slaughterbots are weapons that select and apply force to targets without human intervention. Instead, they make their decisions with artificial intelligence software, which is essentially a series of algorithms. For the first time ever this year, the bulk of the 125 nations that belong to the United Nations’ Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) said they wanted new laws to be introduced on killer robots. However, some countries that are developing these weapons including the U.S. and Russia, were in opposition, making a unilateral agreement impossible. The U.K. and several other nations also objected. “We would have liked to have seen everyone get behind that,” Emilia Javorsky, a physician scientist who leads the Future of Life Institute’s advocacy program on autonomous weapons, told CNBC. “All it takes is one,” she added. The conference concluded Friday, with the group pledging to “intensify” discussions and consider possible steps that are acceptable to all. The fact that the CCW failed to agree on anything concrete last week was hailed as an “epic failure” by Javorsky. “It is now blatantly clear this forum — whose unanimity requirement makes it easily derailed by any state with a vested interest — is utterly incapable of taking seriously, let alone meaningfully addressing, the urgent threats posed by emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence,” she said. Verity Coyle, a senior advisor at Amnesty International, said in a statement that the window of opportunity to regulate killer robots grows ever smaller as research and testing of these weapons presses forward. “The CCW has once again demonstrated its inability to make meaningful progress – it’s now time that committed states take the lead on an external process that can deliver the type of breakthrough we’ve previously seen on landmines and cluster munitions,” she said.

### 2AC – Solvency – Biotech

#### UN biotech regulation wrecks developing countries widening the tech gap

Miller, 96 (Henry I. Miller, Robert Wesson Fellow of scientific philosophy & public policy, Hoover Institution Consulting Professor at the Institute for International Studies at Stanford University, 7-1-1996, "Biotechnology and the UN: New challenges, new failures," Nature, <https://www.nature.com/articles/nbt0796-831>, LASA-CSK)

The overregulation of technology, though damaging to industrialized countries, is particularly devastating to developing countries because it acts as yet another, and formidable entry barrier to R&D. Thus, the UN's design's on biotechnology are likely to increase further the income gap between the "have" and "have not" nations, which more than doubled between 1960 and 1991. Poorly crafted regulatory proposals constitute a lose-lose proposition for the developing world. Virtually every field trial of every new biotechnology derived variant of rice, cassava, maize, wheat, sweet potato, or other plant would require an environmental assessment. These schemes would divert scarce resources to the regulation of activities that are largely of negligible risk, send inaccurate messages about risk to the public and to politicians, and impose a "tax" on innovation which is based on the excessively regulated techniques. These approaches also make new products artificially expensive to use, test, and produce: New crop plant varieties must be adapted to local conditions and the expense of testing them would become prohibitive. Thus, unnecessary case by case 834 review would diminish the degree and speed of technology diffusion to the developing world, developing countries would be prevented from participating in worldwide technological trends, and the technology gap that already exists between the industrialized and developing countries would widen further. There are bitter ironies in the demand that the developing world adopt unscientific, technique-based and anti-innovative regulatory approaches. First, the clamor usually originates from regulators or activists in industrialized countries who both regard Third-world regulation as an opportunity to validate their minority view of genetic engineering as manifesting unique risks and see prospects for becoming players on a larger stage. Second, such policies preferentially undermine research on precisely the kinds of low-value-added but important products that are most needed in developing countries- safer and more nutritious foods, improved bioremediation agents, and alternatives to chemical pesticides and fertilizers. At the same time, these poorly conceived policies exact a high cost, they are unlikely to afford any increment in environmental or public health protection

### 2AC – Solvency – Cyber

#### Perm solves – UN fails without the US pushing for cyber norms

Herman, 21 (Slate Herman, J.D. Candidate, University of Colorado Law School, 1-29-2021, "Cybersecurity and the U.N. Charter: A Square Peg in a Round Hole," Colorado Technology Law Journal, <https://ctlj.colorado.edu/?p=701>, LASA-CSK)

In this note I contend that the U.N. Charter fails to adequately address non-state actors or provide effective alternatives to armed conflict. The question of how to correctly classify these actions under international law then arises. Article 51 of the U.N. Charter imbues nations with the power of self-defense against an armed attack.[20] The ancient concept of an armed attack creates significant ambiguity when applied to the revolutionary concept of cyberwarfare. The use of armed forces and other similar definitions are inadequate in their understanding of cyberoperations. The U.N. Charter also fails to prescribe appropriate responses to cyber-attacks and splits appropriate action into two categories, neither of which allow cyber operations to be classified correctly. Current international law does not adequately address the growing problem of cyberwarfare. Specifically, the blind spots created by Articles 2(4), 41, 42, and 51 of the U.N. Charter in failing to address cyber warfare, coupled with lack of responsibility for non-state actors expose the United States to significant risk.[21] The United States must be active in pushing the U.N. to consider new regulations to fix these potholes in the U.N. Charter. Though some governmental bodies seem unwilling to join the discussion surrounding proper international cyberoperations, others leap headlong into the murky topic. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (“NATO”) has taken the largest step to adequately define cyber operations and explain how international legal regimes apply to cyberweapons.[22] In 2009, the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defense Centre of Excellence embarked on a journey to produce a manual on the international law governing cyberwarfare, which became known as the Tallinn Manual.[23] The project collected distinguished practitioners and scholars in an attempt to project how current legal standards would govern this new form of warfare. With its primary focus on wartime action, the Tallinn Manual dives deeply into cyber operations involving the use of force and those that occur in the context of armed conflict.[24] In 2013, this text began serving as a resource for governments and scholars in the legal field.[25] Almost immediately after its publication, the group began work on a second edition of the Tallinn Manual. Released in February 2017, Tallinn 2.0 expanded on the original version and added multiple provisions while updating the original.[26] This manual serves as a background from which I make many of my assumptions and conclusions.

#### Empirics prove China and Russia block all UN attempts at cyberspace international law

Segal, 17 (Adam Segal, 6-29-2017, "The Development of Cyber Norms at the United Nations Ends in Deadlock. Now What?," Council on Foreign Relations, <https://www.cfr.org/blog/development-cyber-norms-united-nations-ends-deadlock-now-what>, LASA-CSK)

The prospects of developing norms of state behavior in cyberspace have been looking positively bleak recently. The Lazarus Group, which appears to have ties to North Korea, is suspected of being behind the WannaCry ransomware attacks that spread to 150 countries and hobbled the UK’s National Health Service. Russian hackers have been named as the culprits in the hacking of the Democratic National Committee (DNC), and are suspected of being responsible for blackouts in Kiev in 2015 and 2016. This week’s attack, Petya/NotPetyta, first looked like a new version of ransomware, but now seems designed for disruption and destruction. The attack appears to have originated in Ukraine, on the day before a holiday marking the 1996 adoption of that country’s first constitution, so early suspicion is that Moscow is behind the attacks, though this is still highly speculative (Russia itself has also suffered from Petya). Despite the proliferation of state-backed attacks, for a brief window, there did seem to be some forward movement on cyber norms. This week China and Canada agreed not to conduct cyber espionage for commercial gain against each other. Beijing has now signed similar agreements with the United States, United Kingdom, Australia, and the G-7 and G-20. In 2013, a group of government experts (GGE) at the UN agreed that international law, and especially the UN Charter, applies to state activity cyberspace. In 2015, the same group agreed to four peacetime norms promoted by the United States: states should not interfere with each other’s critical infrastructure; they should not target each other’s computer emergency response teams; they should assist other nations investigating cyberattacks; and they are responsible for actions that originate from their territory. That process seems to have reached a dead end. Last week, Michelle Markoff, deputy coordinator for cyber issues in the State Department published an explanation of the U.S. position at the end of the 2016-2017 GGE process. Markoff’s frustration is palpable, as she writes the current “report falls short of our mandate and doesn’t meets the standard that the previous GGEs have set for us.” The sticking point is the application of international law. The United States wanted to use the report to begin explaining exactly how international law applies in cyberspace, especially in the areas of the exercise of the inherent right of self-defense and the law of state responsibility, including countermeasures. Other participants argued that it was too early in the development of cyberspace to have such deliberations, and would in themselves be destabilizing. They would be “incompatible with the messages the Group should be sending regarding the peaceful settlement of disputes and conflict prevention.” Markoff does not call out the obstructionist states by name, but it is safe to assume China and Russia were among them. Beijing has never liked the idea that international law applies to cyberspace, and began walking back the 2013 report almost as soon as the ink was dry. Chinese officials have consistently stressed the UN Charter and the importance of sovereignty without mentioning the rest of international law. During the 2015 meeting of the UN group, China’s representative proposed taking out all references to international law in the upcoming report. In the wake of the DNC hack, Moscow would certainly not support discussions about countermeasures, which might cover U.S. reprisals for hacking and information operations.

### 1AR – Solvency – AT UN Bad Links to Aff

#### NATO doesn’t require UN oversight

Perry , 98 (James T. Perry, 1-1-1998, "," Naval War College Press, <https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=https://www.google.com/&httpsredir=1&article=1458&context=ils>, LASA-CSK)

Chapter VIII of the UN Charter13 refers to regional organizations, such as NATO, in the context of appropriate regional action in the maintenance of international peace and security.14 It is in this area that a relationship exists between the two organizations, with ultimate authority centered in the United Nations. Excepting the area of international peace and security, however, the relationship between the UN and NATO is not hierarchical. When the NATO Charter was established in 1949 by the Treaty of Washington,15 it made no mention of any relationship to the Security Council as a "regional arrangement," nor did it contain any provision providing for action only upon the authorization of the Security Council, or for reporting activities "in contemplation." Instead, the Treaty of Washington expressed the obligation of NATO's member states to be that of "collective self,defense" under Article 51 of the UN Charter and, correspondingly, embodied only the obligation to report "measures taken" to the Security Council.16 This formulation was adopted by the United States and its NATO allies because subordination of NATO actions as a regional arrangement to Security Council review in advance during the Cold War would have subjected all actions to Soviet veto. By characterizing NATO's military actions as "collective self,defense" under Article 51, there would be no action of a "regional arrangement" under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter and no prior Security Council review.

## Theory

### 2AC – International Fiat

#### International fiat is a voter. Especially in this case since the aff fiats every major international actor.

#### Limits – 195 countries multiplied by individual agencies makes in-depth engagement and predictability impossible.

#### Aff ground – the aff only gets to fiat the USFG cooperates with NATO, letting the neg fiat the 193 countries of the UN makes the topic impossible for the aff

#### Not real world – no policymaker can decide between two countries international organizations – means no answers in the literature base.

### 2AC – Multi-Actor Fiat

#### Multi-Actor fiat is a voter –

#### Fairness – it fiats 193 of the 195 recognized countries – that’s functionally a fiat the whole world CP

#### Education – No lit base for Kosovo, Western Sahara, and Taiwan solvency deficits

## NB

### 2AC – AT: UN Good NB

#### UN charter outdated and ineffective in carrying out effective policy

Boothby, 99 (Derek Boothby, 07-14-1999, " NATO and the United Nations," No Publication, <https://www.csdr.org/95Book/Boothby.htm>, LASA-CSK)

Personally, I doubt very much that the U.N. should ever be in the business of military peace enforcement. That is a task that should be carried out by fully effective military organizations, such as NATO or groups of states willing to do and capable of doing the job. Such organizations should first be given political license from the U.N. Security Council under Chapter VII; the operations should be halted if that political license is subsequently withdrawn. But the U.N. itself has neither the military command systems nor the political cohesion to carry out military-enforcement tasks. Moreover, it is arguable that a U.N. that carried out military peace enforcement--except perhaps in the most unique circumstances--would find itself in much political trouble with its members. In my view, Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, as an authority for U.N. peace enforcement, was written for a different era and has little military application to today's world.

#### The UN doesn’t have the scientific expertise to be effective

Juma, 2000 (Calestous Juma, Fall 2000, "The UN's Role in the New Diplomacy," Issues in Science and Technology, <https://issues.org/stalk-4/>, LASA-CSK)

As a new form of international diplomacy develops to deal with a number of emerging issues in which science and technology play a central role, the United Nations (UN) risks being relegated to the sidelines. The influence and effectiveness of diplomats and international civil servants will increasingly depend on the extent to which they can mobilize scientific and technical expertise in their work. This need not require the UN to acquire extensive in-house scientific competence, but the organization–especially the office of the secretary general–must learn to tap advisory services to identify, mobilize, and use the best available expertise. Although a large number of UN agencies, programs, and treaties rely on scientific and technological expertise for their work, they are not designed to receive systematic science advice as a key component of effective performance. In most cases, science is used in the UN to support special interests and political agendas that do not necessarily advance the goals of the organization. But this should not come as a surprise. The UN was founded and grew to prominence in the era of the Cold War, when much of diplomacy was devoted to dealing with threats arising from external aggression. Today, attention is turning to issues such as infectious diseases, environmental degradation, electronic crimes, weapons of mass destruction, and the impacts of new technologies, which in the past would have been the concern of individual nations but have now grown to international stature. The UN’s capacity to deal with these questions must also grow. What is notable about the UN is that it includes organizations that cater to a wide range of jurisdictions but not to the growing community of science advisors. Even agencies such as the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) have done little to provide a platform for the world’s science advisors. Specialized agencies such as UNESCO, the Food and Agriculture Organization, the World Health Organization, and the UN Industrial Development Organization relate to the UN secretary general’s office through a bureaucratic hierarchy that is not responsive to timeliness. They are generally accountable to their governing bodies and are heavily influenced by the interests of activist states. Even UN programs that deal with science-based issues such as the environment have yet to place knowledge at the core of their operations. They have failed to take into account the long-term implications of scientific advancement for their operations. Much of the attention in these programs is devoted to territorial aggrandizement and not to the role of knowledge in global governance. They are vestiges of Cold War institutional structures.

#### P5 veto powser means nothing gets done

Koliward, 21 (Priya Koliwad, 10-06-2021, "Is the United Nations Still a Relevant International Body? — The World Mind ," World Mind, <https://www.theworldmind.org/home/2021/10/26/is-the-united-nations-still-a-relevant-international-body>, LASA-CSK)

One of the arguments at the forefront in support for eliminating the United Nations is that the most powerful organ of the UN, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), is not relevant to the modern world. The main evidence for this claim is that the UNSC only has five permanent member states: USA, Russia, Britain, China, France) and 10 non-permanent member states. This structure results in misuse of veto power, often blocking key decisions that are needed by nations with little to no representation. It also prevents developing countries from being represented, which is necessary in the present day.

Over the years, it has become clear that the Security Council’s permanent members have little interest in internal reform. Since this is the case, it is in the best interest of the other UN member states to continue to push for reform. With powerful countries moving to unilateralism, populism, and nationalism at the expense of multilateralism and collective action, a united and forward-looking Security Council capable of effectively driving the wider United Nations to achieve its goals is essential.

### 2AC – AT: RCA NB

#### Russia and China prevent Security Council effectiveness – NATO avoids

EL-Bawab, 4/26 (Nadine El-Bawab, 4-26-2022, "UN Security Council's inaction on Ukraine prompts questions on reform," ABC News, <https://abcnews.go.com/International/security-councils-inaction-ukraine-prompts-questions-reform/story?id=84222703>, LASA-CSK)

While experts said the U.N. facilitates diplomacy and keeps the lines of communication open between major powers, the Security Council's actions are tied to major powers' interests. The inequity of the Security Council is that nothing can be done if it opposes what the major powers want, Poast said. While the Security Council has not been able to pass any resolutions regarding the war in Ukraine or act to stop or prevent it, Poast said taking action is not part of its role. That is why NATO was created; to have a separate union, without China and Russia, allowing Western states to take action. "One of the big things that drove the process of creating NATO was the recognition sitting around late 1947 [to] 1948, that, from the British and the American perspective, they weren't going to be able to work with the Soviet Union," Poast said, adding that the powers needed a separate entity that would enable them to take action. Even in the early days of the U.N., Poast said there were concerns over whether the British, French and Americans would be able to work with the Soviets and Chinese. This was proven in 1999 when NATO took action in Kosovo, after the Security Council did not act, and again in 2011 when NATO intervened in Libya. "It's also a key reason why we're seeing NATO be very active in this war, because of exactly the fact that the U.N. Security Council has been ineffective in doing anything about this. But in contrast, NATO has been highly effective in trying to do something to support Ukraine," Poast said.